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We live in the here and now, at a certain location and in a 
specific moment of time which provides our minds with am-
ple stimulation that must be processed in order to survive. In 
addition to being determined by available external stimuli, 
our behavior is often driven by our current internal states, 
visceral needs and emotions. Thus, for purely evolutionary 
reasons, it is beneficial to focus on the present and remain 
vigilant for relevant information and events that we continu-
ously encounter or experience. Furthermore, being mindful, 
committed, and present in the current moment is associated 
with numerous psychological benefits that include increased 
psychological well-being and positive emotional states 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). However, 
despite its beneficial consequences, it is hard to be consist-
ently mindful because our cognitive capacities are limited 
and the encountered information often remain insufficiently 
processed. People have finite working memory (Conway & 
Engle, 1996) and attentional (Dukas, 2004) resources, con-
tinuously fail to notice numerous changes and events sur-
rounding them (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons 
& Rensink, 2005), and easily get depleted by everyday de-
cisions as well as acts of self-regulation (Baumeister, Brat-
slavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Therefore, our capacity 
for managing present oriented information and behaviors is 
highly constrained. Although this may suggest that all our 
cognitive resources should be maximally engaged in more 
efficient processing of present oriented tasks, it has been 
demonstrated that our minds often engage in various types 
of mental time travel, in thinking about the past (retrospec-
tion) and contemplating the future (prospection; Suddendorf 
& Corballis, 1997). 
While the necessity and the benefits of memory and past 
oriented processing are somewhat self-explanatory, the ad-
vantages of mental time travel towards the future may not 
be immediately obvious. We are all aware that our daily 
stream of consciousness includes a certain amount of plan-
ning and preparation for the future, and that our emotional 
states are often oriented towards anticipated events. How-
ever, these examples of future considerations represent a 
very small fraction of cognitive processes and phenomena 
oriented towards the future. In reality, our brains and minds 
are constantly focused on the future (Andrews-Hanna, Rei-
dler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010) and this provides us with 
numerous benefits and advantages. The present manuscript 
presents a review of different instantiations of future ori-
ented cognition and describes their underlying information 
processing and neural mechanisms. Therein, a very broad 
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conceptualization of future oriented cognition is adopted 
which reflects various processes that incorporate explicit or 
implicit considerations of the future states of the body or 
the environment (Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010). 
In doing so, we will not discuss the differences in the use 
of various terms often found within this field, such as ex-
pectations, prediction, anticipation, or others, as these have 
been addressed elsewhere (Bubic et al., 2010). However, it 
has to be emphasized that such differences are relevant as 
the use of different terms across diverse domains hinders 
the attempts of bringing various approaches together and 
unifying the acquired knowledge within the field. In addi-
tion, we will not present arguments for different factors that 
may be used for developing a more systematic taxonomy 
of future oriented processes, such as the type (probabilistic 
vs. deterministic), specificity (high vs. low), level (explicit 
vs. implicit), or timescale (short vs. long-term) of predictive 
processes. Instead, in the following sections we will review 
different instantiations of future oriented processes across 
the different domains that form the structure of the present 
manuscript.
VARIOUS MANIFESTATIONS OF FUTURE  
ORIENTED COGNITION
Future oriented cognition refers to a wide range of pro-
cesses encountered within different mental domains. On the 
one hand, these include very basic predictive processes en-
countered within the sensory and motor domains (Bar, 2007; 
Butz, Sigaud, & Gérard, 2003; LaBerge, 1995), as well as 
more elaborate explicit mental constructions of possible 
personal future scenarios (episodic future thinking) investi-
gated within the mental time travel domain (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 1997). Regardless of the characteristics of specific 
future oriented processes, they are all associated with a num-
ber of benefits, such as an increase in accuracy and speed 
of information processing, structuring of more coherent en-
vironmental representations, more efficient use of cognitive 
resources, and improved information seeking (Butz & Pez-
zulo, 2008; Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007; LaBerge, 1995; 
Llinás, 2002). Given these benefits, it is not surprising that 
the relevance of predictive processes within the perceptual, 
attentional, and motor domains was already recognized in 
the 19th century (James, 1890; LaBerge, 1995). In addition, 
the relevance of expectations for learning, motivation, and 
behavior in general was also recognized during the early 
decades of psychological research (Bandura, 1977; Rosen-
thal & Jacobson, 1968; Tolman, 1948). 
Recent decades have seen a revival of interest in predic-
tive processing within all the aforementioned domains. Spe-
cifically, when studying future oriented cognition in these ar-
eas, researchers employ a wide range of paradigms from the 
domains such as visual recognition, sequential processing, 
motor control, mental state reasoning, declarative memory, 
and social cognition, to name a few. Typically, this does not 
imply that researchers always develop specific paradigms 
for investigating individuals’ expectations, but instead uti-
lize numerous approaches already developed within the field 
for studying the relevance of future orientation therein. In 
addition, in recent years researchers have begun to explore 
individual differences in personal tendencies related to the 
explicit consideration of future outcomes and consequences 
during decision making. Furthermore, a novel direction of 
research was established within the field of mental time trav-
el that studies prospection, an ability to simulate the expect-
ed personal future, albeit in a shortened and more abstract 
manner when compared with real events (Gilbert & Wilson, 
2007). These studies have indicated an intricate and insepa-
rable relationship between future oriented cognition, mem-
ory, and imagination (Mullally & Maguire, 2013; Schacter, 
Addis, & Buckner, 2007). Furthermore, the relevance of fu-
ture oriented processing for spontaneous, default mode pro-
cessing has been established (Buckner, 2007). 
In the next sections, we discuss these different cognitive 
future oriented processes as well as their underlying neural 
mechanisms in more detail. We present arguments to show-
case the relevance of future orientation across different do-
mains. First, we discuss the mechanisms underlying predic-
tion in the sensory-motor and attentional, as well as higher 
cognitive domains. Next, the relevance of considering the 
future for motivation and goal-directed behavior will be de-
scribed. Finally, we will present findings that demonstrate 
the importance of predictive processes in prospection, so-
cial, and self-referential processing, while discussing their 
similarities to other, seemingly unrelated phenomena such 
as creativity and imagination. Within each domain we first 
present behavioral findings and the insights that have been 
gained with respect to the neural underpinnings of the phe-
nomena of interest (for an overview, please refer to Table 1 
and Figure 1). Finally, we describe the advantages of future 
oriented cognition and discuss the benefits of considering 
what lies ahead for our judgment, decision making, and psy-
chological well-being. 
PREDICTION IN SENSORY-MOTOR AND  
ATTENTIONAL DOMAINS
Studying prediction in sensory-motor and attentional 
domains has a very long tradition, as the early psychological 
experiments conducted in 19th and 20th century by Wundt, 
Lange, and James demonstrated how perceptual expecta-
tions may shorten recognition time and guide actions (La-
Berge, 1995). In addition, anticipatory processing within the 
motor system was addressed in the 19th century within the 
so-called ideomotor principle (James, 1890), as well as by 
von Helmholtz who speculated about the relevance of ex-
pected action outcomes for subsequent perception (Bays & 
Wolpert, 2008). Subsequently, these ideas were further ad-
vanced in the 1950s by von Holst, Mittelstaedt, and Sperry 
who experimentally demonstrated the role of motor-to-sen-
5
BUBIĆ and ABRAHAM, Neurocognitive bases of future oriented cognition, Review of Psychology, 2014, Vol. 21, No. 1, 3-15
sory feedback in controlling behavior (Wolpert & Flanagan, 
2001). Ever since then, the role of anticipation has been 
explored within the motor system and different sensory do-
mains, revealing the existence of numerous instantiations of 
such processing that take place on different temporal scales 
and are based on different types of information. 
For example, in a classical motion perception task that 
requires a judgment of time to collision, we make predic-
tions about the future motion of involved objects even when 
we are not explicitly required to do so (Lin, Franconeri, & 
Enns, 2008; Tresilian, 1999). In addition, examples of pre-
dictive processing in vision include the representational mo-
mentum (Kerzel, 2005) and the flash-lag effect (Nijhawan, 
1997), although some more complex explanations of these 
phenomena have been suggested (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 
2000; Whitney & Murakami, 1998). Furthermore, there 
is evidence that visual search involves a certain degree of 
predictive processing, and that identifying expected events 
within the visual display is faster and more accurate when 
compared to unexpected events (Enns & Lleras, 2008). 
When considering the types of contexts that trigger predic-
tive processing within sensory systems, it has been deter-
mined that expectations may be formulated in situations 
where a stimulus is presented in isolation (Bar, 2007) or a 
contextually rich environment (Bar, 2004). In these cases, 
perceptual expectations are grounded in long-term memory 
that allows us to connect the available input with previous 
experiences. For example, a global shape of an object can 
trigger the recollection of previously encountered similar 
stimuli and facilitate its recognition even before the more 
detailed, identity revealing information become available 
(Bar, 2003, 2007). 
In addition, formulating visual expectations may be 
based on context frames, namely structures that provide 
visuospatial and abstract contextual associations and, con-
sequently, facilitate object perception (Bar, 2004; Fenske, 
Aminoff, Gronau, & Bar, 2006). In this context, it is impor-
tant to note that facilitated object and pattern recognition 
have also been demonstrated in situations where expertise 
results in strengthened associative processing among fea-
tures or objects (Cheung & Bar, 2012), suggesting a close 
relation between prediction and expertise. Specifically, ex-
perts typically have more elaborative knowledge structures 
that enable predictions about stimulus input and automati-
cally direct attention towards the most important stimulus 
and object features, thus enabling more efficient pattern 
recognition (Bilalić, Langner, Erb, & Grodd, 2010; Bilalić, 
Turella, Campitelli, Erb, & Grodd, 2012; Cheung & Bar, 
2012). 
While the predictive process in the aforementioned 
cases is initialized only after stimulus presentation, in other 
situations expectations may be formulated prior to the ap-
pearance of the stimulus itself when triggered by task in-
structions (Carlsson, Petrovic, Skare, Petersson, & Ingvar, 
2000; Simmons, Matthews, Stein, & Paulus, 2004) or by 
the stimuli preceding the critical event (Schubotz & von 
Cramon, 2001). Specifically, predictability of the incom-
ing stimuli may be afforded by regular relations of different 
complexity between events (Näätänen, Tervaniemi, Suss-
man, Paavilainen, & Winkler, 2001; Opitz & Friederici, 
2007; Sutton, Braren, Zubin, & John, 1965), as demonstrat-
ed by numerous studies within the perceptual domain (Re-
millard, 2003; Schubotz, 2007; Schubotz & von Cramon, 
2001, 2002). For example, it has been show that learning 
triggered by short-term exposure to non-random patterns 
leads to predictive processing within subsequent pattern 
repetitions. Interestingly, such predictive strategies may be 
employed even when random input is presented, thus re-
flecting the brain’s attempts to extract an orderly pattern 
(Schubotz, 2007; Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002). The rel-
evance of prediction for efficient processing of sequentially 
ordered stimuli is even more evident in the motor domain 
(Clegg, DiGirolamo, & Keele, 1998; Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Ha-
zeltine, & Heuer, 2003). In addition, within this domain it 
has often been argued that prediction constitutes a necessary 
prerequisite for action because all behavior is contingent on 
formulating response-related anticipations (Kunde, Elsner, 
& Kiesel, 2007). Numerous studies have indeed shown 
that action representations include their anticipated effects 
as well as the underlying intentions (Kerzel, 2005; Schütz-
Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). In addition, prediction has been 
associated with other forms of motor imagery, action under-
standing (Jeannerod, 2001; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007) 
as well as motor control (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Simi-
lar to the perceptual domain, a relevance of expertise for 
predictive processes in action understanding has also been 
established (Balser et al., 2014). 
With regard to the neural implementation of prediction, 
the motor system has thus far received a lot of attention. 
Based on the results showing the involvement of the motor 
system not only in motor behavior, but also in perceptual 
sequencing, it has been suggested that prediction in the mo-
tor domain and some forms of perceptual expectations may 
reflect common underlying neural mechanisms (Schubotz, 
2007). In this account, predictive sequencing across domains 
is afforded by the so-called internal models that mimic the 
dynamics of relevant body or environmental states, thus pro-
viding bases for anticipatory processing. The motor system 
would represent an ideal candidate for formulating such 
models and simulating the expected events, regardless of 
their domain of origin (Jeannerod, 2001; Wolpert & Flana-
gan, 2001). In addition, orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal 
cortices have been related to other forms of perceptual an-
ticipatory processing. Specifically, it has been argued that 
the recognition of visual objects presented in isolation is 
aided by the process of rapid transmission of crude object 
information to the orbitofrontal cortex. Here, predictions are 
formulated and sent back to the visual cortices in order to 
facilitate the processing of other object features (Bar, 2003, 
2007). In a comparable fashion, it has been suggested that 
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context-based expectations are formulated within the medial 
prefrontal cortex, and then communicated to the connect-
ing parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices (Bar, 2004; 
Bar & Aminoff, 2003). In addition, the relevance of insula 
engagement was established with respect to expectations 
regarding painful sensory stimuli (Ploghaus et al., 1999). Fi-
nally, while Gómez, Vaquero, and Marrufo (2004) suggested 
that the frontomedial cortex may be critical for initiating per-
ception and action preparation by recruiting specific sensory 
(and motor) cortices needed for subsequent processing, Bru-
nia (1999) argued for the relevance of the prefrontal cortex 
in organizing anticipatory behavior in general. 
However, when discussing the neural correlates of pre-
dictive processing it is important to highlight that these 
encompass more brain regions than those formulating spe-
cific predictions. As such expectations need to be commu-
nicated to all the relevant brain systems, further processing 
is potentially implemented though changes in connectivity 
across brain regions (O’Reilly, Mesulam, & Nobre, 2008) 
or long-range phase synchronization (Gross et al., 2006). 
Once communicated, expectations modulate the activity 
within the sensory cortices that later process the anticipated 
events. For example, prediction is associated with changes 
of neuronal threshold in sensory cortices (Gómez et al., 
2004) as well as the suppression of specific brain rhythms 
(Bastiaansen & Brunia, 2001), and the appearance of par-
ticular event-related anticipatory components, such as stim-
ulus preceding negativity, contingent negative variation, or 
the readiness potential (Brunia, 1999; Praamstra, Kourtis, 
Kwok, & Oostenveld, 2006), as measured using electroen-
cephalography (EEG). 
Interestingly, it has been suggested that anticipatory and 
actual somatosensory stimulation engage the same soma-
tosensory network (Carlsson et al., 2000), indicating that 
expectations indeed preactivate and facilitate the relevant 
sensory cortex that will later process that particular stim-
ulus (LaBerge, 1995). Finally, it is important to note that 
numerous effects related to anticipatory processing greatly 
resemble the classical effects of attention that also include 
facilitated processing of attended, similar to expected, stim-
uli (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Hopfinger, Buonocore, & 
Mangun, 2000). However, although expectations and at-
tention often coincide and may interact within different 
contexts, it is important not to confuse the two processes 
as they also differ in numerous ways. For instance, while 
expectations are associated with an attenuation of neural 
responses, attentional effects are typically characterized by 
enhanced processing of relevant stimuli (Summerfield & 
Egner, 2009). 
Summarizing the available findings, it is important to 
emphasize the relevance of future orientation in both mo-
tor and sensory domains. As mentioned earlier, predictive 
processes have been established as crucial for action un-
derstanding and execution, leading to suggestions that the 
motor system should be viewed as central for simulating 
expected events across different domains (Jeannerod, 2001; 
Schubotz, 2007; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). With respect 
to the sensory domain, it has been suggested that percep-
tion in general may be conceptualized as constituting three 
cycles: activate (feedforward sweep that carries information 
from the peripheral organs), predict (feedback sweep that 
carries information from higher to lower regions in the sen-
sory hierarchy), and confirm (stable state of resonance that 
is realized after matching predictions with the incoming in-
formation; Enns & Lleras, 2008). Such an account incorpo-
rates prediction as an inherent part of perceptual processing, 
and is in line with other accounts that have posited predic-
tive processing as a fundamental mechanism underlying our 
perception, cognition, and behavior in general (Friston & 
Stephan, 2007; Pezzulo, 2008). 
THE RELEVANCE OF FUTURE ORIENTATION FOR 
HIGHER COGNITION, MOTIVATION AND GOAL-
DIRECTED BEHAVIOR
The importance of future oriented processes for higher 
cognition was first recognized within the domain of learning, 
when Edward Tolman (1932) suggested that learning is con-
tingent on non-behaviorist processes such as expectations 
and beliefs. He introduced the idea of purpose into learning 
and behavior in general, and paved a way for modern theo-
ries of motivation. Specifically, although motivational and 
emotional processes may seem to represent psychological 
domains grounded in the present, the regulation of our be-
havior is strongly contingent on how we represent our future. 
Hence, it has long been recognized that self-regulatory pro-
cessing depends on our self-efficacy beliefs which are based 
on previous experiences and current appraisal, as well as our 
considerations of future options (Bandura, 1977; Bandura, 
Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 2001). Such views were 
further expanded, and the relevance of future expectations 
for motivation was widely explored among various expec-
tancy-based theories (Atkinson, 1964; Wigfield & Eccles, 
2000) as well as theories that have related such predictions 
with individuals’ feelings of control (Rotter, 1966; Weiner, 
1985). These accounts emphasize that our predicted success 
in a task determines whether or not we will be motivated to 
engage in a certain behavior, while our expectations depend 
on how much we feel in control of our failures and success-
es. Therefore, our current and previous experiences shape 
the perceived quality and likelihood of potential outcomes 
which, together with the value placed on each of them, deter-
mine our motivation for action (Hall & Fong, 2007). 
Furthermore, one of the core components of motivat-
ed and goal-directed behavior includes the formulation of 
goals (Covington, 2000; Nicholls, 1984; Schunk, 1990) and 
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). Once formu-
lated, goals are easier to accomplish if we make an explicit 
plan and formulate an organized method for action in ad-
vance (Friedman & Scholnick, 1997). This includes a very 
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complex set of operations that unite various cognitive, emo-
tional, and motivational processes brought together in order 
to accomplish something envisioned for the future (Morris 
& Ward, 2004). Such processing is highly interconnected 
with motivational and self-regulatory processes, and is also 
related to other higher cognitive functions such as problem 
solving (Baker et al., 1996), prospective memory (Wino-
grad, 1988), judgment, and decision making. 
However, developing a plan is not a guarantee of its 
success, and accomplishing our plans and goals typically 
requires a certain degree of self-regulation that is, as men-
tioned earlier, strongly connected to our representations of 
future outcomes (Bandura, 1977; Bandura et al., 2001). For 
example, it has been argued that people exercise their self-
control through anticipated guilt in situations where current 
temptations pose a threat to their long-term goals and want-
ed future outcomes (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 
1995). In addition, it has been shown that having positive 
expectations in relation to our goals is associated with high-
er investments of energy and efforts, as well as more suc-
cessful performance (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). However, 
it is important to distinguish between having specific posi-
tive expectations and ungrounded positive fantasies, as the 
later type of processing is far less beneficial to individuals’ 
performance (Oettingen, 2012). Also, it is important to rec-
ognize that our expectations include not only cognitive rep-
resentations of potential future events, but also the relevant 
emotional valuations of such events. And, although it has 
been shown that our predictions of emotional outcomes are 
associated with numerous biases and errors (Gilbert, Gill, 
& Wilson, 2002; Gilbert & Wilson, 2009; Loewenstein, 
O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003), they are nevertheless crucial 
for directing our behavior and choosing our future goals. 
Keeping all that in mind, it is possible to conclude that 
pure expectancy judgments based on individuals’ experi-
ences and performance history are highly related to their 
intentions and behavior (Bandura, 1977; Maddux, 1999; 
Scheier & Carver, 1992; Taylor & Brown, 1988) and that 
future orientation represents a very significant factor in hu-
man motivation and self-regulation. In order to engage in 
goal-directed behavior we need to be able to envision the fu-
ture and its potential outcomes. In the course of this activity, 
we form different types of explicit and implicit predictions, 
such as self-efficacy, outcome, and general or generalized 
expectations (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002) that are all based 
on some form of previous experience. Such representations 
of the future influence our judgments, decisions, and cur-
rent behavior, and allow us to transcend the here and now. 
However, as will be shown in the next sections, the man-
ner in which we construe our personal future is much more 
complex and far-reaching as it represents one of the key pro-
cesses that define who we are.
Before discussing this topic in more detail, it is impor-
tant to review one additional field of study relevant to fu-
ture orientation and higher cognitive processes. Specifically, 
with regard to the influence of future orientation on deci-
sion making, in recent years investigators have explored the 
importance of individual differences related to the way we 
consider different temporal directions. It has been argued 
that individuals differ with respect to their time perspective, 
namely the manner in which they typically assign the flow 
of personal experiences to temporal categories (Zimbardo 
& Boyd, 1999). We build different temporal and cognitive 
frames that determine how we process, encode, and recall 
the relevant information, thus influencing our judgments 
and decisions. In some situations, it is useful to base our 
judgments on recollected experiences, while in others it 
may be important to be fully focused on the past or to con-
sider what might occur in the future. 
Although it has been suggested that individuals should 
make their judgments in a balanced and flexible manner, 
based on the contextually appropriate time frame, most peo-
ple are typically biased towards one of these time frames 
(Strathman, Boninger, Gleicher, & Baker, 1994; Zimbardo 
& Boyd, 1999). Among these, the relevance of predomi-
nant future orientation and the characteristics of individu-
als who are willing to base their current decisions on the 
expected future outcomes have been widely explored. For 
instance, higher future orientation has been related to re-
sponsible health behaviors (Joireman, Shaffer, Balliet, & 
Strathman, 2012), higher environmental awareness (Joire-
man, Lasane, Bennett, Richards, & Solaimani, 2001), lower 
aggression (Moore & Dahlen, 2008), and lower likelihood 
of procrastinating during learning (Specter & Ferrari, 2000). 
Furthermore, consideration of future consequences has been 
associated with effort and persistence (Joireman, Balliet, 
Sprott, Spangenberg, & Schultz, 2008), a finding that reso-
nates with previously described motivational accounts that 
emphasize the relevance of expectancies for goal-directed 
behavior. 
Finally, consideration of future consequences has also 
been related to social cognition and behavior. For instance, 
it has been shown that a more pronounced future orientation 
is related to higher organizational commitment and more 
cooperative behaviors among individuals and groups (Joire-
man, Daniels, George-Falvy, & Kamdar, 2006; Wolf et al., 
2009). This is in line with findings showing the influence of 
time perception on the pursuit of social goals (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) and suggestions emphasizing 
the importance of prediction for social cognition (Brown & 
Brüne, 2012). It is noteworthy that the interest in the rel-
evance of future oriented cognition for social information 
processing is now growing given that the study of interper-
sonal expectancy effects represents one of the historically 
most relevant research domains within the field of psy-
chology (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968), as it demonstrated 
the manner in which our expectations of other people may 
influence our behavior towards them, as well as their own 
behavior and future outcomes. Our implicit and explicit 
representations of the future therefore influence not merely 
our thoughts and actions, but also that of those around us. 
And, similar to the previously discussed motor and percep-
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tual domains, the association between future orientation and 
expertise has also been revealed with respect to higher cog-
nitive and social processes (Boorman, O’Doherty, Adolphs, 
& Rangel, 2013).
When discussing the neural underpinnings of future ori-
ented processing within higher cognitive, emotional, and 
motivational processes, it is important to note that these 
functions have generally proven to be too complex for 
straightforward neuroscientific explorations. Given such 
complexity, it is not surprising that planning engages nu-
merous brain regions, among which the prefrontal cortex 
is typically recognized as the key, albeit not sole, region 
enabling such processing (Fuster, 2008; Miller & Cohen, 
2001; Ruby, Sirigu, & Decety, 2002). The relevance of the 
prefrontal cortex, namely its ventromedial portions, has also 
been established for the affective reactions (promotions) 
associated with future events that constitute an important 
part of predictions that are crucial for goal-directed behav-
ior (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Gilbert & Wilson, 2009). 
In addition, emotional processing has been associated with 
the engagement of the amygdala and the anterior cingulate 
cortex (Ueda et al., 2003), while the relevance of the basal 
ganglia, and especially the ventral striatum, has been estab-
lished for motivational and reward processing (Knutson & 
Cooper, 2006; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). Furthermore, 
prefrontal engagement has also been associated with indi-
vidual differences in the dominance of future, when com-
pared to present or past orientation, together with the por-
tions of the parietal cortex and the cerebellum (Wittmann et 
al., 2011).
Overall, this section presented numerous examples of 
how expectations influence our goal selection and engage-
ment in different settings. They often determine how we 
cognitively construe the available information, whether we 
approach or avoid certain behaviors and how we organ-
ize and conduct our actions. All of this indicates that our 
views of the future often shape our evaluations of the pre-
sent and the behaviors we choose for the future. Thus, it can 
be concluded that future orientation represents an inherent 
part of our judgments, decisions, emotions, and motiva-
tions. However, although a lot is known about the cogni-
tive mechanisms underlying the influence of expectations 
on specific aspects of our thoughts and behaviors, there are 
still numerous unknowns within each of these specific areas. 
Even more importantly, a unified view of the role of future 
orientation in decision making and goal-directed behavior is 
yet to be developed. In addition, the neural implementation 
of future orientation in this context represents another area 
that needs to be advanced in future studies. 
PROSPECTION
In comparison to most topics within the broadly con-
ceptualized domain of future-oriented cognition which stem 
from well-established theoretical and empirical founda-
tions, investigations on prospection are, relatively speak-
ing, still in the nascent phase. Our ability to contemplate 
future events is formally investigated in psychology and the 
neurosciences under umbrella terms such as prospection, 
future thinking, mental time travel, foresight, imagination, 
prospective cognition, forecasting, and constructive simula-
tion. To date, the empirical focus on prospection has been 
primarily limited to the personal, episodic, or autobiograph-
ical realm.
Behavioral evidence demonstrates that there are strong 
parallels between the subjective experience that accom-
panies past and future thinking (D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004, 2012). Positive events are associated with a 
greater level of phenomenological intensity than negative 
events in both prospection and retrospection. The same is 
true of the subjective experience of temporally close events 
in the past and future, which are also associated with more 
sensorial and contextual detail, relative to that of temporally 
distant events. This resonates with findings indicating that 
more distant future events are somewhat more abstract than 
those of more proximal events (Liberman & Trope, 2008) 
and that our imagined future selves resemble other people 
more than our present selves (Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 
2008). Not surprisingly then, the manner in which we value 
distant outcomes and rewards is quite different when com-
pared to proximal ones (Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2008; 
Soman et al., 2005). When discussing the discrepancies be-
tween contemplated events in one’s personal past and fu-
ture, one of the central differences is that representations 
of future events are associated with less detail than that of 
past events. This happens although our visual–spatial con-
structive abilities are less burdened when remembering sen-
sory details about events in our past compared to imagining 
events that could take place in the future (D’Argembeau, 
Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Van der Linden, 2010). In addition, 
we interpret future events differently than past events, in 
that future behaviors are viewed as more intentional than 
the past ones (Burns, Caruso, & Bartels, 2012). Neurosci-
entific evidence has consistently revealed that the brain re-
gions that are active when we contemplate personal events 
in the near or distant future strongly overlap with those that 
are engaged when we ponder our episodic or autobiographi-
cal past. Regions that are part of this brain network include 
the medial prefrontal cortex, medial parietal cortex, anterior 
lateral temporal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, and medial 
temporal lobe structures (Schacter et al., 2007). Notably, the 
prospection brain network closely corresponds to the brain’s 
default mode network, which is active under conditions of 
rest and low task load, and is held to reflect processing de-
mands associated with mind-wandering, internal mentation, 
and stimulus-independent thought (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). 
This network of brain areas is also involved in other 
facets of higher order cognition, like mental state reason-
ing or theory of mind, moral cognition, and self-referential 
thought (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008), all 
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of which involve reasoning about the perception, cognition, 
or behavior of one’s self and/or others. Prominent ideas that 
have proposed a common factor or functional metric that 
would explain the involvement of the prospection brain 
network (in whole or part) in this wide array of mental op-
erations include self-projection (Buckner & Carroll, 2007), 
mental scene construction (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 
2007), constructive simulation (Schacter, 2012), proactive 
associative processing (Bar, 2007), and evaluation (Legrand 
& Ruby, 2009). Indeed, it is possible that these proposed 
factors operate collectively to a much stronger extent dur-
ing episodic prospection and retrospection compared to 
when engaging in mental state, self-referential, or moral 
reasoning. For example, thinking about one’s personal past 
or future has been shown to involve an aggregation of fac-
tors such as self-referential processing, a subjective sense 
of time, narrative structure, retrieval of multimodal details, 
feeling of familiarity, construction or simulation of the 
hypothetical event in question, and so on (Hassabis et al., 
2007). 
Due to the considerable overlap in the brain regions 
involved during episodic prospection and retrospection, 
a significant challenge that remains for researchers to re-
solve is what makes these two facets of mental time travel 
discrete from one another. Is this distinction a purely the-
oretical one or is it instantiated at the level of dissociable 
brain functions? If the latter is the case, which facet(s) of 
the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie mental time 
travel allow for the differentiation between past versus fu-
ture thinking? Apart from the behavioral evidence discussed 
earlier, there are also neuroscientific grounds that support 
the presumption that the neural and information processing 
mechanisms underlying prospection and retrospection are at 
least partially distinct. 
Neuroimaging evidence has, for instance, indicated a 
stronger engagement of select regions within the prospec-
tion brain network during episodic prospection relative to 
episodic retrospection (Abraham, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 
2008; Okuda et al., 2003). Regions such as the anteriormost 
aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area 
10), which is held to orchestrate the integration of infor-
mational output from two or more separable cognitive op-
erations (Ramnani & Owen, 2004), have been implicated in 
this regard. The neuropsychological evidence from amne-
sic patients is, however, generally mixed with some studies 
demonstrating poor episodic prospection in relation to poor 
episodic retrospection, while others show that this relation-
ship is not as clear-cut (Verfaellie, Race, & Keane, 2012). 
For instance, the widely investigated patient K.C. is able 
to discount the value of future rewards, within the range of 
controls in terms of rate and consistency, although he has 
episodic amnesia and is unable to imagine future experi-
ences (Kwan et al., 2012).
Apart from trying to determine the specific functions 
of different regions within the prospection brain network, 
a novel focus that is slowly gaining prominence in the lit-
erature is to gather evidence that will clarify why our ca-
pacity to reason and imagine the future has evolved at all. 
Suddendorf, Addis, and Corballis (2009) have proposed that 
this ability to simulate our hypothetical future evolved as it 
enhances fitness by virtue of “enabling action in prepara-
tion of different possible scenarios that increased present or 
future survival and reproduction chances”. The accumulat-
ing behavioral evidence thus far lends supports to this idea. 
Future-oriented thoughts have, for instance, been shown to 
facilitate performance on a prospective memory task (Nero-
ni, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2014). Information process-
ing biases that typically accompany future-oriented cogni-
tion, such as the retention of positive or neutral information 
over negative information, allude to the adaptive nature of 
such operations in that they are conducive to psychologi-
cal well-being (Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 2012). Indeed, 
insufficiencies at the level of future oriented cognition are 
particularly relevant with regard to the information process-
ing biases that are typically associated with depression and 
anxiety disorders (Miloyan, Pachana, & Suddendorf, 2014).
As the field of prospection continues to evolve, several 
issues have emerged that could critically impact current the-
oretical conceptualizations of these operations. For instance, 
many of the key ideas in this domain stemmed from the vast 
expanse of research on episodic memory. As a result, the 
temporal factor and the personal factor occupy much of the 
empirical focus (e.g., the neural and behavioral correlates 
of immediate versus distant episodic past versus episodic 
future thinking) and are regarded as the key elements that 
modulate the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie fu-
ture thinking in general. This is somewhat misleading given 
Table 1
A general overview of the major brain regions that are involved in 
future oriented cognition across different domains
Information processing 
domain
Brain regions implicated in future oriented 
cognition
Sensory processing & 
attention
Prefrontal cortex (medial, dorsolateral, 
orbitofrontal), insula, retrosplenial cortex, 
parahippocampal cortex
Motor processing Motor cortex, premotor cortex, striatum, cerebellum
Higher cognition & self-
regulation Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
Emotional and reward 
processing
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex, basal 
ganglia
Prospection
Medial prefrontal cortex, medial parietal 
cortex, lateral inferior parietal lobe, 
anterior lateral temporal cortex, medial 
temporal lobe
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that overlapping brain networks are demonstrably involved 
in other aspects of imaginative thinking that are neither nec-
essarily defined by temporally-based factors, such as theo-
ry of mind, moral reasoning, and self-referential thinking 
(Buckner et al., 2008), nor personally-based factors, such 
as semantic future thinking (Abraham et al., 2008), coun-
terfactual or “what-might-have-been” reasoning (Levens 
et al., 2013), and even divergent thinking (Abraham et al., 
2012). Recent theoretical proposals have, in fact, called for 
de-emphasizing the episodic or autonoetic aspects of future 
oriented cognition and highlight the central role played by 
semantic memory in the same (Irish & Piguet, 2013; Stock-
er, 2012).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A review of future oriented cognitive processes across 
different domains that include perception, motor behavior, 
attention, and higher order cognition as well as emotional, 
motivational, and self-referential processing was presented 
in this paper. Furthermore, the neural implementation of 
such processes was discussed, showing the engagement of 
almost all brain regions and neural systems. Although the 
focus in this review was placed primarily on the benefits 
of predictive processes across different domains, it is also 
important to highlight numerous open issues and challeng-
es that remain for this field. The biggest of these includes 
rather limited attempts of bridging future oriented processes 
across different domains of study. Given that researchers 
typically use many distinct methods for studying predictive 
processes of various types and temporal structures, it is hard 
to reconcile manifold views that have emerged in recent 
decades in this field. In addition, differences in terminology 
also represent a barrier for developing a more systematic 
approach for understanding the phenomenon of interest. 
Finally, the fact that predictive processes may not always 
be very distinct from other functions that have traditionally 
been labeled non-predictive also needs to be acknowledged 
to a higher degree in the years to come. 
Despite these challenges, it may still be concluded that 
future orientation represents a very fundamental character-
istic of our cognitive and neural architecture, which is in 
line with previous accounts that have labeled the mind as an 
anticipatory device (Pezzulo, Hoffmann, & Falcone, 2007). 
As the field of future oriented cognition continues to grow 
in prominence as a driving force for empirical work in psy-
chology and the neurosciences, it is essential to further ex-
pand the theoretical conceptualizations of these operations 
and extend our understanding of their practical implications 
for everyday living. 
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